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Abstract
The security of energy supply has again become a similarly hot topic as it was
during the oil crises in the 1970s,not least due to the recent historical oil price
peaks.In this paper,we analyze the energy security situation of the G7 coun-
tries using a statistical risk indicator and empirical energy data for the years
1978 through 2007. We find that Germany’s energy supply risk has risen sub-
stantiallysincetheoilpricecrisesofthe1970s,whereasFrancehasmanagedto
reduce its risk dramatically, most notably through the deployment of nuclear
power plants. As a result of the legally stipulated nuclear phase-out, Ger-
many’s supply risk can be expected to rise further and to approach the level of
Italy.Duetoitsresourcepoverty,Italyhasbyfarthehighestenergysupplyrisk
among G7 countries.
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Today, we experience the conﬂuence of continuing instability in the Middle East, a gro-
wing resource nationalism, Russia’s annual gas supply interruptions directly following
the New Year’s ﬁreworks, and a surge of oil demand by emerging countries, particular-
ly China. This has made energy supply security a high policy priority in the European
Union (COM 2008a). Yet, despite the almost ever-increasing signiﬁcance of this topic,
there are just a few contributions to the literature that have developed and employ-
ed quantitative (in)security measures, with FRONDEL and SCHMIDT (2008), GRUBB et
al. (2006), MARKANDYA et al. (2005), and JANSEN et al. (2004) being among the most
recent studies.
In this paper, we empirically analyze both the past and future energy security si-
tuation of G7 countries using the statistical indicator of the long-term energy supply
risk conceived by FRONDEL and SCHMIDT (2008). This indicator condenses empirical
information on the imports of fossil fuels, such as oil, gas, and coal, originating from
a multitude of export countries, as well as data on the indigenous contribution to the
domestic supply of all kinds of energy sources, including biofuels and other renewable
energies. The empirical outcome is a single ﬁgure that characterizes the total risk of a
country’s reliance on fossil fuel imports at a given point in time. While taking account
of all energy sources used in a country, both renewable and non-renewable, the basic
ingredients of our concept are (1) a country’s own contribution to the total domestic
supply of any fuel vis-a-vis the fuels’ import shares, (2) the probabilities of supply dis-
ruptions in export countries, and (3) the diversiﬁcation of the primary energy mix, that
is, the variety of energy sources and technologies employed to satisfy demand.
The following section provides for a short summary of the empirical concept that
FRONDEL and SCHMIDT (2009) suggest for measuring a country’s long-term energy
supply risk. In Section 3, this concept is applied to empirical data of G7 Countries pro-
vided by the International Energy Agency (IEA) for the past (1978-2007), as well as to
projections for 2020, followed by an in-depth analysis explaining the outcomes of our
risk calculations. The last section summarizes and concludes.
42 An Empirical Supply Risk Measure
While there are several competing concepts, FRONDEL and SCHMIDT (2008) build on
the work of JANSEN et al. (2004) in that their risk indicator strongly relies on the noti-
on of diversity. Yet, in contrast to JANSEN et al. (2004), who base their energy security
indicator on SHANNON’s (1948) diversity measure, the risk indicator’s fundamental
basis is HERFINDAHL’s (1950) concentration index. This choice is due to FRONDEL and
SCHMIDT’s (2008) scepticism concerning whether any meaningful security indicator
may be based on SHANNON’s diversity measure. In the following section, we will de-
monstrate for the example of G7 countries that FRONDEL and SCHMIDT’s risk indicator
is meaningful indeed: The inter-temporal picture drawn on the basis of our risk calcu-
lations appears to be perfectly in line with our qualitative analysis of these country’s
primary energy supply mix.
Denoting the probability of supply disruptions in export country j by rj,F RON-
DEL and SCHMIDT (2009) suggest the following quadratic form as a measure capturing
a nation’s supply risk related to fuel i:
riski := x
T
i · R · xi = x
2
id · rd +
J  
j=1
x
2
ij · rj, (1)
where the share of export country j in the domestic supply of energy resource i is
designated by xij, and the respective indigenous contribution by xid. By deﬁnition,
xid + xi1 + ... + xij + ... + xiJ =1 ,i =1 ,...,I. (2)
The risk-characterizing matrix R is deﬁned by R := rT ·I, where I is the identity matrix
and rT := (rd,r 1,...,rj,...,rJ) may be denoted as risk vector. Arguably, the probability
of a disruption of a nation’s own contribution to domestic supply can be assumed to
equal zero: rd =0 .
From the perspective of an import country, the components of share vector xi
deﬁned by xT
i := (xid,x i1,...,xij,...,xiJ) are the primary instruments to improve supply
security. If xid equals unity, a nation is autarkic with respect to fuel i. In this polar case,
the supply risk related to fuel i, as deﬁned by (1), takes on the minimum value of zero,
indicating a perfectly secure fuel supply. In the opposite polar case, in which the total
5supply of fuel i exclusively originates from highly instable export countries such that
rj =1for all countries j =1 ,...,J, riski takes on the maximum value of unity. In short,
the fuel-speciﬁc risk deﬁned by (1) is normalized: 0 ≤ riski ≤ 1.
Deﬁnition (1) comprises three major aspects of energy security: (1) a country’s
owncontributionxid tothetotaldomesticsupplyoffueli,(2)thepoliticalandeconomic
stability of export countries as captured by risk vector r, and (3) the diversiﬁcation of
imports as reﬂected by vector xi. The role of diversiﬁcation is incorporated in the fuel-
speciﬁc indicator riski by building on HERFINDAHL’s (1950) index, with which one can
measure the concentration of fuel imports:
Hi := s
2
i1 + ... + s
2
ij + ... + s
2
iJ, (3)
where sij denotes the share of export country j in total imports of fuel i. The share sij
relates to country j’s contribution xij to the total domestic supply of fuel i as follows:
xij = sij(1 − xid). (4)
According to this expression, increasing the indigenous contribution xid decreases xij,
thereby alleviating the import dependency with respect to fuel i and, hence, riski.
To measure a nation’s entire vulnerability with respect to all kinds of energy im-
ports, FRONDEL and SCHMIDT (2009) suggest evaluating the following generalization
of the fuel-speciﬁc supply risk deﬁned by (1):
risk := w
T · X
T · R · X · w = w
T · Π · w. (5)
wT := (w1,...,wi,...,wI) represents a vector whose non-negative components wi reﬂect
the shares of the various fuels and energy sources in a nation’s total energy consump-
tion and, hence, add to unity: w1 + ... + wI =1 . The columns of matrix X comprise the
indigenous as well as the export country’s contributions to the domestic supply of each
6of the I fuels and energy sources:
X :=
⎛
⎜
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎜ ⎜
⎜
⎜ ⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
x1d .x id .x Id
x11 .x i1 .x I1
.....
x1j xij xIj
.....
x1J .x iJ .x IJ
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟ ⎟
⎟
⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎟ ⎟
⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
. (6)
The diagonal elements πii of the product matrix Π := XT ·R·X are identical to the fuel-
speciﬁc supply risks: πii = riski =
 J
j x2
ijrj ≥ 0. Non-vanishing off-diagonal elements,
πkl =
 J
j xkjxljrj > 0fork,l =1 ,...,I,k  = l,takeaccountofthefactthat,forinstance,oil
supply disruptions in an export country may be correlated with those of gas. Finally,
it bears noting that the total supply risk (5) falls between zero and unity. In practice,
though, the indicator’s concrete outcome is typically much smaller than unity.
3 Energy Supply Risks of G7 Countries
On the basis of energy data provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA), we
now employ these concepts to compare the past and future energy supply risks of the
G7 countries. The probabilities rj of supply disruptions in individual export countries
are identiﬁed here primarily by applying the OECD (2008) system used for assessing
country credit risks, where countries are classiﬁed into eight risk categories (0-7), with 7
standingforthehighestriskcategory.Examplesofthesecountry-speciﬁcclassiﬁcations,
which have been weighted to lie within the range of zero to unity, are displayed in Table
A1 of the appendix. Although these classiﬁcations are commonly used to gauge loan
loss risks, they should also satisfactorily characterize a country’s political and economic
situation, as political risks and other risk factors are also integrated into the OECD
assessment.
Theseclassiﬁcationsareassumedheretobeinter-temporallyconstant,anassump-
tion that turns out to be inconsequential, as the classiﬁcation of an individual country
hardly changes over time. Alternatively using the contemporaneous classiﬁcation of
7each country leaves our results almost unaltered. Furthermore, our calculations are ba-
sed on the assumption that nuclear power, as well as renewable energy sources, should
be treated as a domestic resources. The explanation for this treatment is that nuclear
fuels are frequently imported in times when prices are low and stored up to several de-
cades before used in nuclear power plants. This treatment is also the prevailing practice
in international energy statistics.
Using the country-speciﬁc primary energy mix given in the appendix, as well as
thefuelimportsharesthatcanbeobtainedfromtheIEAstatistics,theapplicationofrisk
indicator (5) reveals that Germany’s and Italy’s energy supply risks rose substantially
over the period from 1978 to 2007, whereas France and Japan have managed to reduce
their risks dramatically, thereby reaching an almost similarly relaxed energy security
situation as the U. S. and the U. K. (see Figure 1). Together with Canada, whose energy
supply risk is close to zero, these are the resource-rich G7 countries.
Figure 1: G7 Energy Supply Risks (Germany 1980:100)
Today, Germany’s energy supply risk is only surpassed by that of Italy. In the past,
this was not always the case: At the beginning of the 1980s, France and Japan exhibited
much larger energy supply risks than Germany. In contrast to Germany, though, France
has been able to reduce its risk, above all through the massive deployment of nuclear
8power plants. As a consequence, the contribution of nuclear power to the primary ener-
gy mix increased from about 8% in 1980 to nearly 43% in 2007, whereas the share of oil
decreased from about 56% to 33% between 1980 and 2007 (see Table A2 of the appen-
dix). Among all G7 countries, France displays by far the largest share of nuclear energy,
being one major reason for its rather relaxed supply situation today.
Japan reduced its energy supply risk in comparable dimensions as France. Part of
the story has been an increase in the share of nuclear power, albeit a rather moderate
one, from 6% in 1980 to slightly more than 13% in 2007 (see Table A3). In addition, Ja-
pan improved the diversity of supply by increasing the relative contributions of natural
gas and hard coal. At the same time, the former dominance of oil was diminished sub-
stantially, with the oil share being reduced from about 75% to 46% in 2007. In contrast,
brown coal is not used at all due to the lack of any reserves in Japan, while renewa-
ble energy technologies play only a minor role. Not least, Japan spread its gas imports
among a growing number of energy exporting countries, thereby achieving a signiﬁ-
cant reduction of its gas-speciﬁc risk (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Gas-Speciﬁc Risks
In contrast to Japan, Germany’s imports of oil and gas has concentrated more and
more on Russia, thereby substituting the former dependence on OPEC oil with a strong
9reliance on Russia’s oil, gas, and coal reserves. At present, Russia is by far Germany’s
mostimportantoilprovider,beingresponsibleforasmuchasabout40%oftotaloilsup-
ply. As a consequence, the country’s oil supply risk has roughly doubled – in terms of
the fuel-speciﬁc indicator (1) – between 1980 and 2007 (see Figure 3). Furthermore, the
drastic decline of Germany’s relative contribution to its domestic gas supply has been
encountered by surging gas imports from Russia. The current contribution of Russian
pipelines to Germany’s gas supply amounts to about 37% and, hence, is almost as high
as Russia’s oil supply share. By contrast, Russia’s abundant energy reserves played on-
ly a minor role for Germany in the 1970s. Not surprisingly, therefore, Germany’s gas
supply risk has more than doubled since then (see Figure 2).
Figure 3: Oil-Speciﬁc Risks
That Germany’s energy supply situation has deteriorated substantially since the
oilpricecrisesofthe1970shasanotherreasoninthedeclineofGermanhardcoal,which
is due to the widening gap between domestic production cost and world market prices
of coal (FRONDELet al. 2007). Within the next decades, Germany’s energy supply risk is
likely to rise much further: Given the nuclear phase-out decision, which stipulates the
end of nuclear power in Germany at around 2024, and the foreseen dismantling of the
hardcoalsubsidiesby2018,ourcalculationssuggestthatGermany’senergysupplyrisk
can be expected to rise even if the national goal of a 30% share of electricity production
10from renewable energies will be reached in 2020 (see Figure 1). A major reason is that,
based on the present share in electricity production of about 15%, the required increa-
se in “green” electricity is much lower than the contribution of nuclear power, which
currently amounts to almost 30%. By contrast, given the projections for 2020 presented
in the tables of the appendix, our calculations of the future energy supply risks of all
other G7 countries indicate that the risks either stagnate or further decrease, as is to be
forecasted for Japan for example.
Similar to Germany, the supply risk of Italy has increased signiﬁcantly over the
last decades. The country displays by far the highest energy supply risk across G7,
owing primarily to its highly undiversiﬁed energy mix: For Italy, brown coal and nucle-
ar energy do not contribute to the energy supply at all, while oil and gas play an over-
whelming role (see Table A5). It is thus all the more critical that Italy depends so heavily
on oil and gas imports, with import shares being 93% and 88%, respectively. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the oil- and gas-speciﬁc risks of Italy are the highest among
all G7 countries (see Figures 2 and 3), as well as the fuel-speciﬁc risk regarding hard
coal (Figure 4). The hard-coal speciﬁc risk has increased substantially since 2000 due to
the rising share of imports from Indonesia, which increased from some 10% to about
32% in 2007, whereas the hard coal imports from highly reliable countries such as Aus-
tralia, Canada, and the U. S. shrank. With the highest risks with respect to oil, gas, and
hard coal, it is no wonder that Italy faces the highest energy supply risk altogether.
Relative to the risk values of Italy and Germany, there is a large gap between the
energy supply risks of both these nations and the resource-rich countries of Canada,
U. K. , and the U. S. While Canada’s supply risk has remained negligible for decades,
the U. S. risk has risen moderately since the oil crises of the 1970s. Mainly, this increase
can be attributed to the growing share of oil imports due to the decline in domestic
oil production, resulting in an increase of the oil-speciﬁc risk (Figure 3). In contrast,
the coal- and gas-speciﬁc risks appear to be insigniﬁcant. Given these low risk judg-
ments, the enormous efforts in producing bio-ethanol, derived mainly from maize and
spurred by tax incentives (IEA 2006e:387), seem to be rather irrelevant for energy se-
curity reasons. In 2006, the U. S. became the world’s largest producer of bio-ethanaol
11(IEA 2006e:387), thereby employing large fractions of more than one third of its annual
maize production for this task.
Finally, there has been a moderate increase in the total supply risk of the U. K. ,
most notably because the hard-coal speciﬁc risk has grown signiﬁcantly (Figure 4),
whereas the oil- and gas-speciﬁc risks have remained zero. Responsible for the incre-
ase in the hard-coal speciﬁc risk was the declining domestic production. Its share in
total supply fell from 57.1% in 2000 to 26.9% in 2007, while the dependence on Russian
imports rose from 9.0% to 33.5% in same period of time.
Figure 4: Hard-Coal-Speciﬁc Risks
4 Summary and Conclusion
Using FRONDEL and SCHMIDT’s (2008) risk indicator, this article suggests that, concer-
ning their energy supply risks, the G7 countries can be classiﬁed into three groups. The
ﬁrst group consists of the energy-rich countries Canada, the U. K. and the U. S., whose
energy security situation appears to be rather relaxed: The calculated risk values are
quite moderate and rather stable. Most important for this result is that, although not
entirely self-sufﬁcient, these country’s fuel imports are divided among relatively sta-
12ble countries. France and Japan, the members of the second group, have managed to
reduce their risks by diversifying both their primary energy mixes and supply struc-
tures. In France, this was mainly achieved by drastically increasing the contribution of
nuclear power, which is treated here, as well as in in international energy statistics, as a
domestic resource. Germany and Italy, ﬁnally, are the only G7 countries whose energy
supply risks rose substantially over the period from 1978 to 2007.
The qualitative analysis of the primary energy mix and the diversiﬁcation of fuel
imports substantiates our risk calculations, thereby reconﬁrming the picture drawn in
Figure (1). A key reason for the increased energy supply risk in Germany is its rising
dependence on Russian oil and gas, and most recently, its increased hard coal imports.
At present, Russia is by far Germany’s most important oil and gas provider, being re-
sponsible for as much as about 40% of total oil and gas supply, respectively. With the
completion of the new gas pipeline called Nord Stream, it is most likely that Western
Europe’s reliance on Russian gas will grow much further, not least due to the shrinking
gas production of the U. K. and the Netherlands. Given such perspectives, it is not sur-
prising that Italy, which highly depends on gas and oil imports due its abstinence from
nuclear energy, reconsiders the deployment of nuclear power plants. With the legally
stipulated nuclear phase-out, Germany therefore seems to be isolated not only among
G7 countries, but almost all over the world.
13Appendix
Table A1: Normalized OECD Risk Indicators
Country Risk Country Risk
Algeria 3/7 Netherlands 0
Angola 6/7 Nigeria 6/7
Canada 0 Norway 0
China 2/7 Poland 2/7
Colombia 4/7 Russia 3/7
Ecuador 1 Saudi-Arabia 2/7
Germany 0 South Africa 3/7
Iran 6/7 U.S. 0
Iraq 1 United Arab Emirates 2/7
Kuwait 2/7 United Kingdom 0
Libya 1 Venezuela 6/7
Mexico 2/7 Others 1
Sources: OECD (2008). Note: 1 stands for extremely instable countries, whereas
0 indicates extremely stable countries.
Table A2: Primary Energy Mix of France
1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2007 2020
Oil 61.1 55.9 40.6 38.4 35.3 33.9 33.5 32.9 32.1
Gas 10.1 11.2 11.9 11.4 12.3 13.9 14.6 14.3 14.8
Hard Coal 16.1 16.6 12.2 8.5 6.7 5.8 5.2 5.0 4.5
Nuclear Power 4.3 8.2 28.3 36.0 40.8 42.0 42.5 42.7 41.6
Brown Coal 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Renewables 8.0 7.7 6.7 5.3 4.7 4.4 4.2 5.1 7.0
Note: Shares are based on IEA (2006c, 2004d, 2006d, 2008b). Renewables include hydro-, wind-,
and solar power as well as biomass. Shares for 2020 are based on COM (2008b).
14Table A3: Japan’s Primary Energy Mix
1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2007 2020
Oil 74.9 68.0 55.8 57.1 53.7 50.4 47.7 46.0 36.3
Gas 4.7 6.2 9.6 9.9 10.6 12.6 13.3 15.9 18.4
Hard Coal 13.9 17.2 19.7 17.4 17.7 17.5 21.9 21.9 21.5
Nuclear Power 4.6 6.2 11.9 11.8 15.2 16.1 13.8 13.2 18.5
Brown Coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Renewables 1.9 2.4 3.0 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.3 3.0 5.3
Note: Shares are based on IEA (2006c, 2004d, 2006d, 2008b). Renewables include hydro-, wind-,
and solar power as well as biomass. Shares for 2020 are based on IEA (2008d).
Table A4: Germany’s Primary Energy Mix
1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2007 2020
Oil 45.0 40.8 34.3 35.3 39.6 38.3 35.9 33.9 35.2
Gas 13.3 14.2 13.5 15.4 19.6 20.9 22.6 22.5 25.3
Hard Coal 15.9 17.5 16.2 15.5 14.8 13.4 12.7 14.3 9.2
Nuclear Power 3.2 4.0 10.0 11.2 11.7 12.9 12.5 11.1 4.1
Brown Coal 22.6 21.7 24.0 20.6 11.9 11.3 11.9 11.6 8.6
Renewables etc. 0.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.4 3.2 4.4 6.6 17.6
Note: Shares are based on IEA (2006c, 2004d, 2006d, 2008b). Renewables include hydro-, wind-,
and solar power as well as biomass. Shares for 2020 are based on EWI, Prognos (2007).
Table A5: Italy’s Primary Energy Mix
1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2007 2020
Oil 70.6 69.4 61.0 58.5 57.7 51.3 45.9 44.6 40.0
Gas 16.6 16.3 20.0 25.6 27.7 33.7 36.1 37.0 40.2
Hard Coal 6.8 8.4 11.2 9.6 7.6 7.3 9.1 8.9 9.4
Nuclear Power 0.9 0.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Brown Coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Renewables 5.1 5.5 6.5 6.3 7.7 7.7 8.9 9.5 10.4
Note: Shares are based on IEA (2006c, 2004d, 2006d, 2008b). Renewables include hydro-, wind-,
and solar power as well as biomass. Shares for 2020 are based on COM (2008b).
15Table A6: U. S. Primary Energy Mix
1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2007 2020
Oil 48.5 44.4 43.4 40.0 38.4 38.7 40.7 39.3 39.3
Gas 24.4 26.3 23.1 22.8 24.4 23.8 22.1 22.9 21.0
Hard Coal 14.9 20.0 18.9 22.4 24.3 22.6 22.5 22.4 21.5
Nuclear Power 4.1 3.8 7.0 8.3 7.9 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.4
Brown Coal 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Renewables 7.5 3.4 6.3 5.2 3.7 4.9 4.6 5.2 7.8
Note: Shares are based on IEA (2006c, 2004d, 2006d, 2008b). Renewables include hydro-, wind-,
and solar power as well as biomass. Shares for 2020 are based on IEA (2008d).
Table A7: U. K. Primary Energy Mix
1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2007 2020
Oil 45.4 40.8 38.7 38.9 37.9 36.2 35.6 35.5 39.0
Gas 17.6 20.0 22.9 22.2 29.2 37.8 37.4 36.1 34.5
Hard Coal 32.2 34.2 30.5 29.7 21.0 14.8 16.0 18.8 17.4
Nuclear 4.6 4.8 7.8 8.1 10.4 9.6 9.0 7.2 3.3
Brown Coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Renewables 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.5 5.8
Note: Shares are based on IEA (2006c, 2004d, 2006d, 2008b). Renewables include hydro-, wind-,
and solar power as well as biomass. Shares for 2020 are based on COM (2008b).
Table A8: Canada’s Energy Mix
1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2007 2020
Oil 48.5 46.1 36.3 36.9 33.6 35.0 36.5 35.9 35.9
Gas 24.4 23.6 25.8 26.2 29.1 29.6 29.0 29.0 29.0
Hard Coal 6.4 7.0 7.3 5.4 4.4 6.5 4.8 4.9 4.9
Nuclear Power 4.7 4.1 8.4 9.3 11.0 7.6 8.6 9.0 9.0
Brown Coal 3.0 3.5 5.7 5.3 6.2 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4
Renewables 13.3 15.7 16.5 16.9 15.7 15.8 15.6 15.8 15.8
Note: Shares are based on IEA (2006c, 2004d, 2006d, 2008b). Renewables include hydro-, wind-,
and solar power as well as biomass. Shares for 2020 are identical by assumption.
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